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Abstract
For an economy where knowledge plays an increasingly important role in shaping its dynamics, economics needs a dynamic (Schumpeterian) welfare theory. This paper sketches the role of knowledge in an economy and argues that a static Paretian welfare economics is inadequate, or at least needs to be supplemented. As suggested by the work of Schumpeter, a dynamic welfare economics acknowledges the role of knowledge. 
Towards a Dynamic (Schumpeterian) Welfare Economics
In chapter 17 of his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy Schumpeter (1943, p. 190, italics in original) has introduced some fundaments for a dynamic welfare economics. One passage is especially worth noting:
"we shall call that system relatively more efficient which we see reason to expect would in the long run produce the larger stream of consumers' goods per equal unit of time"
In this paper I will start from the perspective that the newly emerging reality of our economies today is that they are knowledge economies (OECD 1996) . This is recognized in diverse strands of thought in the economics discipline after the puzzling findings in the Growth Accounting literature (e.g. Denison 1967 ). Romer (1987 Romer ( , 1993 has been developing ideas about how knowledge impacts on economic growth, better known as New Growth Theory. The work of Baumol (2002) relates to this. Studying a dynamic, knowledge-based economy requires that a conceptual understanding of knowledge and its role in society is developed and used in economics. The first section discusses this in some measure. My argument is that a knowledge-based economy would also need a different welfare economics that would allow one to evaluate developments in society or government policy. A second section will give an outline of the welfare economic perspective that is now mostly adhered to, that following Pareto. A dynamic, Schumpeterian welfare economics would emphasize the development of knowledge and its use in the economy. Relatedly, the argument in favor of competition in the market and dynamic efficiency is emphatically not based on Paretian considerations of perfect competition (Baumol 2002 , Blaug 2001 , Mokyr 2002 , Nelson 1981 . The third section suggests some elements for a welfare economic perspective. A much debated policy issue that is very relevant for the knowledge-based economy is subsequently looked at to evaluate some measures that governments are currently implementing. How would a dynamic welfare economics evaluate changes in the system of intellectual property right law?
Knowledge and the Dynamics of an Economy
In recent years it has come to be acknowledged that development of new knowledge is an important source of dynamics for an economy. Knowledge is, however, a very much heterogeneous entity and so using notions such as 'capital' to better come to grips with it have little metaphorical value (Dolfsma 2001 ).
To paraphrase Isaac Newton, knowledge is developed by people who could see further because they stand on the shoulders of giants. This, of course, is a well-established observation about the cumulative nature of development of knowledge, but at the same time was a derisive remark against Newton's opponent in a discussion about the nature of gravity in a letter in 1776 to Robert Hooke.
Hooke was a short man who walked bended forward. Knowledge develops as much in a social context as it is cumulative. There are at least two other characteristics of knowledge that entail that in assessing welfare effects, one needs a perspective that takes dynamic processes by which knowledge develops into account. The development of knowledge involves tacit dimensions, and requires coding and decoding. These four characteristics are at work at the individual, the organizational, 3 the regional 4 as well as at a societal level. As at the latter three the knowledge development essentially involves individuals too, I will discuss this at some length. In addition, as the welfare perspective introduced below will take social welfare of a community (society) as a touch-stone, the implications of the characteristics of knowledge development for the dynamics at the societal level are discussed as well.
Knowledge differs from information (data) in that it needs to be interpreted to make sense of.
Michael Polanyi has developed a theory of knowledge acquisition that should also be of interest to economists (see Scitovsky 1977) . Polanyi (1983: 7) argues that (tacit) knowledge is acquired in a process he calls 'subception.' Any piece of information to be transplanted from one person to somebody else is 'recepted ' (ibid.: 5) for the sender. Such a view of knowledge and information differs from the one generally subscribed to in economics. Here, the idea is that additional knowledge will reduce noise (see Denzau & North 1994) .
Persistently diverging learning paths, such as those between A and B in Figure 1 (Lev 2001) . Intellectual property (knowledge made exclusive) also plays an increasingly important role in strategic manoeuvring between firms (Lev, 2001; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Granstrand, 1999 (Nelson 1959 ). This argument is made both in case of patents, as well as in the case of copyrights (Landes & Posner 1989) . Without incentives, agents would not develop new knowledge, or would not make it publicly available.
Nevertheless, it is known that firms do engage in fundamental research and have good reasons for doing so (Rosenberg 1990 ), even when they know they cannot receive a patent to legally prevent others from commercially exploit the knowledge. In addition, not all firms find it worthwhile to apply for a patent (Arundel 2001; Nelson et al. 1987) . Increasingly the arguments legitimising a system of IPRs have shifted to emphasizing the need for these institutions to offer protection so that investments in production facilities can be recouped before copycats who had to spend less in developing a product than the innovator enter the market (Hettinger 1989 ).
Paretian Welfare Economics
Historian of economic thought Mark Blaug (2001, p.39) To date, Paretian welfare theory still dominates, while a characterization made in a 1960 survey of welfare economics still holds as well (Mishan 1960, p.198 ):
"No growth or innovation takes place, no uncertainty exists and individual tastes remain unaltered. In addition, the working population is fixed and is, in some sense, fully employed. Within this framework it is further assumed that individual behaviour is consistent, and (…) that the individual is the best judge of his own wants."
For my purposes, the first part of the quote is especially noteworthy. As Paul Romer (1994) argues, however, the conditions that are here placed under the c.p. clause are far from rare conditions. The kind of analysis that needs to posit these assumptions may thus not be as relevant as one might assume: "to keep things simple, set aside the niggling disputes about consumer surplus as a welfare measure" is what he suggests (Romer 1994, p.15; cf. Blaug 2001, p.47) .
A Dynamic Welfare Perspective
A more appropriate (additional) welfare theory would be acknowledging the dynamics in today's knowledge economies. The comparative static foundations of a Paretian approach are less appropriate in such circumstances. Indeed, as Tyler Cowen (2000) has argued, there have been more attempts at suggesting different theories to the established welfare economics of Vilfredo Pareto. Cowen (2000, p.xiii) distinguishes "three dominant yet incompatible strands": ordinalist Paretian welfare theory, applied cost-benefit analysis used in practical policy, and cardinalism of which Amartya Sen is a representative. The latter "returns to the purely theoretical realm but rejects Paretianism"; it "is less systematic and unified than the other two strands".
The public interest in the creation of new knowledge has been long established, mainly due in more recent decades to Richard Nelson (1959 Nelson ( , 1990 . In a dynamic economy, a static approach to welfare, emphasizing the end-state kind of competition is not very appropriate, however. Thus, "welfare loss triangles are admitted and downplayed" as Nelson (1981, p.106 ) has expressed it, following Schumpeter (1942) . A welfare perspective emphasizing the dynamics in an economy will need to combine insights from a diverse set of related fields as such a perspective has not been developed to date (cf. Mokyr 2002, pp.21-27 ).
Schumpeter (1942, especially Chapter 17) indicates that the effects of choices made by private or public parties should (also) be evaluated in terms of their long-term effects -which alternative leads to the most attractive outcome in the future? Schumpeter seems to indicate that both measurable effects in the market as well as more immeasurable effects inside and outside of the market should be taken into consideration, although he is not very clear about how to develop these ideas into more operational terms. In line with Schumpeter's work, and prompted by a number of other scholars, I would suggest that 'communication' between agents plays an important role in shaping the processes through which an economy evolves from one stage to the next. To be more concrete, it would seem that there is a positive association between the ease with which communication may occur and economic development (see, e.g., Dudley 1999 , Mokyr 2002 .
In this contribution a main starting point will be to use a Cobb-Douglass type function for the production of knowledge. The use of this kind of function to model the production of knowledge is far from unique (Audretsch 1998 , Dudley 1999 , despite the use of production functions being questioned in general (Shaikh 1990 ) and in part due to the failure of the efforts at growth accounting (Denisof 1967) . It starts from the idea that communication between parties can be more or less difficult, and that these difficulties can be translated into costs. The extent to which communication is difficult (costly)
relates directly to the technology used, as well as to the established (cultural) mores about communication (cf. Mokyr 2002 , Nelson 1990 , as well as to more formal institutions. The costs can be direct or more mediated, and the effects are both on levels of welfare as on the ways organizations take shape (Milgrom & Roberts 1988) . Certainly when "more than 60 percent of the labor force in the United
States is engaged in activities in the 'information sector' of the economy" (Baumol 2002, p.2) it is important to analyze the creation of new information and knowledge and its effects on the economy and its rate of growth.
In line with what Dudley (1999) (Figure 5c ) is to be preferred from the position of the public interest, as knowledge and information is exchanged most readily and conditions for economic and societal development are most conducive.
<Figure 5 about here>
The basic insight that centralization of communication raises costs and is not beneficial for society was also argued for by Nelson (1981, p.101) : "the argument that centralization imposes high information and calculation costs carries considerable weight in a dynamic context". Indeed, for him it is a central argument for favoring capitalism over socialism, as it was for Hayek too. This view contrasts with "the standard theoretical analysis [which] implies that only zero spillovers [of knowledge] are compatible with optimality in innovative activity" (Baumol 2002, p.121) . Rather, extensive dissemination of new knowledge benefits society, and it is of course this truth that is one fundament for the system of Intellectual Property Rights may be the most important. In exchange for a temporary exclusive right to use of newly developed knowledge, a party is to make this knowledge publicly available in order for others to build on it. Many firms even consider it directly beneficial for themselves to disseminate their newly developed knowledge (Baumol 2002, p.73) , for instance because network effects can kick in more readily (Shapiro & Varian 1999) . It is for this reason that firms cluster geographically (Saxenian 1994 Gurbaxani et al. 2000) . Given the nature of the exogenous variables involved, there is no point in assuming constant elasticities of substitution and hence adopt a CES production function. The Cobb Douglass production function is the most readily interpretable production function and is used most often in the literature (cf. Audretsch 1998). The suggested Cobb-Douglass production function primarily provides a heuristic tool here.
Nonetheless, it seems plausible to assume that total output, q, increases as a given population exchanges its information more readily. At any moment (t), a community of size (n) 9 will experience a social welfare (q) generated by communication that can be represented as: In this function A is the well-known efficiency parameter. The concrete shape of the production function makes economic sense. A rise in any of the communication costs will hamper economic activity and thus economic welfare -for this reason communication costs enter the denominator in the equation.
It seems obvious to assume that an increase in any of the three communication costs will negatively affect social welfare. Hence indicating why these costs should be the denominator. Decoding communicated messages is proportional to the size of a population, but needs only to be done by the receiver of a message. On this Dudley (1999, p.602) further remarks that "the efficiency of markets depends on people's ability to negotiate and enforce contracts, output is decreasing in the cost, d, of decoding a unit of information. Owing to network effects, this transaction cost is offset by increases in the number of other people, n t -1, with whom each individual can communicate." Due to the impact of knowledge on productivity, output, q, increases with the amount of information stored. The relation between q and storage cost (s) in inverse under competitive market conditions in particular. There is, furthermore, a direct link between the size of a population and the storage costs that need to be incurred.
Transmission costs, tr, are not directly related to the size of a population; depending on circumstances (costs), a population of a given size can transmit knowledge extensively. If there are scale economies to joint production, for example because (co-) workers or partners need to be coordinated, however, increases in transmission costs will decrease q.
Usually, in reality, any development that affects one type of communication cost is likely also to affect other communication costs. A dynamic welfare perspective, for which some suggestions are brought forward in these pages, might suggest policy measures that violate the Pareto criterion. This would then be for different reasons than possible violations of the Pareto criterion that Pigou, for example, suggests. Pigou (1924, p.78) suggests for example that an income re-distribution from rich to the poor would be justifiable because that would allow "more intense wants to be satisfied". Indeed, for the dynamic welfare perspective suggested here utilitarian considerations play a less prominent role than in the Paretian view. How the suggested dynamic, Schumpeterian welfare perspective suggested here fits in Cowen's classification introduced at the start of this section is not clear. I would not present this approach as necessarily incompatible with the other three kinds, including a Paretian one.
Changes in the System of IPR & Welfare
IPRs are central institutions in a knowledge economy. The relevant legal and technological changes are easily identified, even though not all of their effects are clear. Evaluating developments in IPRs from a perspective of their effects on the dynamics of an economy is entirely appropriate given the objectives for this part of the system of law. Indeed, the purpose of establishing IPRs is twofold: first to stimulate the creation of new (useful) knowledge, and, secondly, to stimulate its dissemination. As Levin et al. (1987) observed among others, however, the positive effects of the presence and extension of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) is often assumed to be self-evident. IPRs are believed to be beneficial for both the firm that has obtained them as well as for society as a whole. There is, of course, some discussion in academic circles about the effects of IPRs and how to evaluate these (cf. Towse & Holzhauer 2002), but these are mostly in comparative-static Paretian terms. The duration and scope of patents is one such a topic. Even from this perspective, a disregard of IPRs need not hurt the innovating firm. Other means to protect ones innovations might be preferred (Levin et al. 1987) , or network effects might better kick in urging the innovating firm to enforce its IPR position less (Takeyama 1994) .
In what follows I will discuss a number of changes in particularly patent law and copyright law in terms of their effects on communications costs. The changes I discuss are not exhaustive, although they do include the most significant ones. Each of the changes in IPR discussed will have effects on all of the three communication costs. The breath of the system of IPR has grown over time, both by adding new IPRs, such as the law protecting legal rights in databases, or by extending existing laws, such as allowing for the protection under patent law of software or business models. In addition, the (statutory)
limitations on the commercial exploitation of the knowledge developed have decreased in number. This is no mixed picture: IPRs have grown stronger over time. Especially in the past decade a number of noteworthy developments can be mentioned. Often, the development in the United States is followed by changes in Europe. In this article, the differences between the two legal systems (US and Europe) are not so much discussed as the similarities between the two. The purpose of the discussion here is thus to evaluate the potential effects of changes a system of IPRs and not so much an analysis of the systems as they exist in a way that is relevant for economists. 11 In doing this, attention will be drawn to elements that are un-or undernoticed from a more standard welfare approach. From this perspective, too, the 11 See Raskind (1998) and Kitch (1998) . For a broad overview, see Towse & Holzhauer (2002) . For a theoretical economic justification for copyrights, see Landes & Posner (1989) ; Hettinger (1989) provides a broader discussion of the rationales for copyrights.
undesirable effects of IPRs in general and patents in particular have been noted. It is argued, for instance, to possibly distort the direction of technological change (Adams & Encauoua 1994) , possibly slow down technological progress (Takalo & Kanniainen 2000) , or possibly reduce incentives to compete in R&D or in downstream product markets (Encaoua & Hollander 2002) . To reiterate, the discussion here about the dynamic welfare effects of changes in IPRs need not be perceived of as a substitute for a more mainstream economic, Paretian approach.
Following the US, Europe has now decided that software can be protected under patent law in addition to copyright law, under which it would be protected previously. The protection patent law offers is shorter than copyright law, but is more powerful. 12 Copyright law protects the particular expression of an idea, while patent law protects the idea itself irrespective of the way in which it is expressed. As ideas can usually be expressed in more than one way, copyrights offer a weaker kind of protection than patents do. Copyrights do not need to be registered in most countries, albeit that registration may facilitate enforcement in some case, and is in force immediately after publication of the material. A patent needs to be filed and approved, involving a variety of expenses.
13
The scope of patent law is most hotly debated at the moment, both in the US and in Europe, in relation to the question of whether business models and software should also be patentable in Europe as it is in the US. Does Amazon.com's patent for 'one-click shopping' not violate the requirement that a patent should involve a physical component and must involve an inventive step? It is true that software is often not clearly distinguishable from hardware, and the demand that a patent application should needs to constitute an inventive step might be difficult to uphold. Reneging on these requirements too easily might, however, give rise to rent-seeking behavior on the part of the producing firms. However, in this case there is only software involved, and the software ('cookies') had already been developed prior to the application by others. The particular business model is a useful invention, to be sure, but 12 In 1998 in the US the duration copyrights last has increased from life of the author plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years, effective immediate. In that same year, again following Europe's example, the duration of patents has increased to 20 years, from 17 years, in the US.
does it not unduly raise communications costs? Certainly it does for other firms who would like to use this method and now have to license it. In addition, the model also allows firms to increase the extent to which they may differentiate their products and discriminate their prices. The net result of the latter is likely to be that consumers suffer (Dolfsma 2004) . The decision to extent the scope of patents to include living tissue is contested as well. Besides the moral aspects of the debate, there is the issue that the distinction between discovering and inventing, never entirely clear, is blurred to the extent that it no longer exists. The latter (invention) used to be a precondition for a patent to be granted. Patentability on living tissue might, but need not, have sped up the discovery of the exact shape of the human genome, for instance, but it will severely restrict the use to which that knowledge can be put for the coming years.
The duration of patents has increased too, most recently (1998) from 18 to 20 years in the US.
The lengthening of the patent for pharmaceutical products is probably less problematic in this light,
given the requirements these face before they are allowed on the market, although it does fit the general picture. Fisher (2001) provides a more extended discussion of the development in patent law and its effects on innovative activity.
Copyrights equally are extended in scope and duration; legal scholar Lawrence Lessig (1999 Lessig ( , 2001 ) is among the more prominent people to lament this development. 14 Most recently, the duration of copyrights in the US was lengthened from life of the author plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years, effective retrospectively. Several years ago both the US and Europe has started protecting databases as part of copyright laws. In the past a collection of 'brute facts' would not constitute a creative act and would thus not warrant protection, now a database is now protected (Maurer et al., 2001 ). The American Digital Milennium Copyright Act (DMCA, came into force 1998) as well as the European Directive on copyright (2000) prohibit agents from making available technical measures that 13 OECD (1997) discusses some of the differences in the way in which patents are administered in the US vs Europe, as well as their implications.
14 His is not a unique position among legal scholars (see Netanel 1996 a.o.) or among economists (see the collection edited by Towse & Holzhauer 2002; in addition, see Stiglitz (1999) .
might be used to circumvent measures taken to protect copyrighted work (Koelman 2000) . As these means can often also be used for other, legitimate purposes, this element of the new copyright law is much debated. It is also unclear what 'making available' means: does a scientist in the field of, e.g., cryptology presenting his work to fellow scientists make available a means to circumvent the technical protection (encryption) on copyrighted work? Encryption is also used to prevent consumers from making copies of work to be used in different regions of the world than their own. The world is divided into regions that each has different hardware specification, which disable software from one region to be recognized in another region. 15 The cost to society seems evident as consumers are restricted in the consumption of something they have legally obtained (Dunt et al., 2002) . Encryption is also being used to prevent consumers from playing a CD on a personal computer, making a copy for personal use, to share with family and close friends, or as a back-up. This increases storage costs especially.
The tendency to strengthen the protection offered by copyright law is also clear in the way in which it is enforced. A law can never spell out how exactly it should be applied, and perhaps it should not as a matter of principle. Therefore, judges when applying the law have room for their own interpretation, certainly in a Roman Law system but even in a Common Law system where leeway for a judge looking at a specific case is more limited by rulings given in other, similar cases. Considerations about the effect of enforcing copyrights for competition in a market are rarely aired -the different fields of law are quite separated even when one sees them conflict in reality, such as IPR clashing with antitrust law (Encaoua & Hollander 2002; Dolfsma 2002b ). An example is the ruling on Napster, where what is called in legal terms 'normal exploitation' of a work is extended to the full exploitation, covering the publication of a work in ways that were not foreseen at the time of the creation. Walt
Disney could not have foreseen that his creation Mickey Mouse (formerly known as Steamboat Willey)
would be published digitally and distributed over the Internet. Now this existing work is also protected under copyright law from distribution over the Internet. In actual fact, there is another catch to this court case against Napster. The court decided that existing players should first be allowed to develop a means by which to make music available in digital form legally, without limiting the time they could take.
16
Copyright law is now no longer just a de facto entry barrier preventing possible entrants from moving into this market, it is a de jure one. How this constitutes an incentive for innovation is difficult to conceive. The tension between copyright law and anti-trust law -always there-mounts.
The developments listed above restrict the use of a legally acquired work by a consumer. Either directly or indirectly the limitation built into copyright law of 'fair use' is restricted by a combination of legal and technical means. 17 At present, legal and technical developments are thus under way to make a 'strong' system of digital rights management (DRM) possible for copyright law. In addition to a strict enforcement of a strengthened copyright law, techniques such as encryption are required. The circumvention of the latter needs then to be prohibited by law as well. Even when these requirements are met, this paper suggests the question whether such a development would not raise communication cost to the extent that the public interest would be hurt, either directly or indirectly.
Relating the discussion about the development of IPRs to the different kinds of communications costs introduced in section 3 is quite straightforward. Indeed, communication costs increase in relative terms as a result of the full-scale application of IPRs to the knowledge economy, a result further shored up by the developments in the system of IPR itself. Decoding costs rise as a result of the technical measures to prevent copyrighted works from being copied, used in certain electronic equipment, or outside certain geographical boundaries. One need to acquire more information carriers than one would otherwise.
Using available knowledge will become more expensive when the scope and duration of IPRs expandthis basically relates to direct transmission costs (licenses), but also to costs that need to be born to find out if one tries to discover one would be violating another party's legal rights (Lessig, 2001) . As the development of knowledge is necessarily cumulative, such costs may be high and having to incur such costs will not be a stimulus for innovation. Storage costs rise as a consequence. The fact that transmission costs rise seems clear, certainly when discussing developments in the area of copyrights.
For copyright law two central notions come into play: publishing and copying. Transmitting knowledge, either using an existing channel or using a new way of publishing material, becomes more expensive due to the developments discussed as the right holders' position has become stronger over the years. A rights holder can refuse to publish a work through a new means of communication. More kinds of works are protected, while the number of limitations to a legal position has been restricted, thus increasing transmission costs. This holds for transmission of knowledge protected under patent law as well, as circumstances under which a party would need to take a license proliferate. Unless the authorities impose a compulsory license when the public interest would demand it, the right holder can prevent the use by others of a particular piece of knowledge, implying a steep increase in transmission costs.
IPR, Competition and Social Welfare
Considering this discussion of the development of IPRs in light of the proposed dynamic welfare perspective developed in earlier session, one could claim with Stiglitz (1999, p.9) that "it is possible that an excessively 'strong' intellectual property regime may actually inhibit the pace of innovation", and slow the pace of economic development. Such a conclusion hinges, of course, on the correct interpretation of the effects of developments in IPRs in terms of communication costs on innovative activity.
Economists would be interested in the effects of such developments on competition in a market too (Boldrin & Levine 2002 , Romer 2002 . These effects are not always clear, and can perhaps be illustrated best by referring to the case of the music industry and the role copyrights play. 18 A legal system's geographical boundaries are important to keep in mind -at least until a complete harmonization on all issues is realized across the globe. The geographical basis of copyright law is a de facto restriction of the relevant market, allowing firms to monitor each other's behaviour closely -indeed a game theoretic analysis shows that collusion is likely to occur (Klaes, 1997) . In the oligopolistic market such as this one is, the outcome is an absence of competition on price (cf. Selten
1973).
It is Baumol (2002) who has argued forcefully that competition in a free market is to be regarded as the main cause for economic growth. His explanation is the creation, but most importantly the diffusion of knowledge that is best facilitated by the free market (see also Mokyr 2002 ). According to calculations by Baumol (2002) , 80% of the economic benefits generated by innovations do not accrue to the parties directly or indirectly involved with the innovation. Extending the scope and duration of IPR should decrease that percentage in the conviction that creation of new knowledge is thus stimulated.
This is premised on a number of beliefs that need not be true. These (often incorrect or incomplete)
views include: The latter issue about the inclination to diffuse newly developed knowledge, stimulated by the system of IPRs relates to the matter of what circumstances stimulate economic growth. Does allowing innovators a larger share of the economic pie stimulate innovation and economic growth such that in absolute (even if not in relative) terms everybody's pie is larger, or is it a zero-sum game? The matter relates directly to a governments' goal of the public good and if that is best served by enforcing IPRs. The argument as 18 Indeed, the existing business model of firms in the music industry is predicated on the existence of copyrights (Huygens et al. 2001 , Dolfsma 2000 . 19 See Hui & Png (2002 ), or Frey (1997 and Le Grand (2003) for a more general argument.
suggested in Section 3 particularly is that the dynamic effects are more important in such considerations than the static, distributive ones.
How may one evaluate the developments in a set of institutions that may be considered among the more important for a knowledge economy from the perspective of a dynamic (Schumpeterian) welfare theory? As knowledge is often communicated as information, the characteristics of information goods are important to note. The well-known characteristics of such goods and the markets they are exchanged on (Dolfsma 1998) entail that a full scale application of IPRs in a knowledge economy is itself a de facto strengthening of IPRs, and certainly to the extent that the knowledge economy is a digital one (Stiglitz, 1999) . Stiglitz (1999, p.10) holds that information goods generate more positive externalities than physical goods. While the social returns to innovation are much bigger than the private ones in general (Jones & Williams 1998) , the creation of new information good (knowledge)
would in this line of reasoning serve the public interest even more. In terms of the relation between the public and the private realm, the latter expands because of this.
Conclusion
A knowledge-based economy needs a welfare theory that is able to grasp and evaluate its dynamics. In this short article, I have taken suggestions from Schumpeter for a dynamic welfare economics and developed some ideas for a dynamic (Schumpeterian) welfare economics. These ideas acknowledge the role of (increases in the) knowledge (base) for an economy. I distinguish storage, decoding and transmission costs related to communication of knowledge, to indicate that an increase in one will lower social welfare. In a final section I have looked at recent development is IPR and evaluated them in the dynamic welfare terms, to suggest that the strengthening of IPRs is debatable from the perspective of the public interest. As knowledge develops cumulatively in direct interactions between people, and is not simply available off the shelve where it winds up like manna from heaven to be put to use freely, the costs of communication has a strong impact on the diffusion of knowledge and the social welfare of a country. Changes in IPRs we are experiencing now increase the costs of communication and could 20 However, see Shavell & van Ypersele (2001) ; see Dolfsma (2000) for some information on the actual highly therefore be a potential impediment for the dynamics of the economy and for social welfare. The conclusion drawn by Romer (1993, p.66 ) that an economics of ideas requires "a policy of openness with few distortions" would thus find support.
skewed nature of the distribution of royalties among musicians. 
